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I. Introduction 
 
The advent of the Internet helped spawn an age of user based interactivity that brought 
forth a new venue for the public performance of sound recordings, and with it a whole new set of 
complexities and questions for the recording industry and the holders of copyrights. Adding a 
further layer to the query, various methods and means came into use that allowed the transfer and 
streaming of music in ways that had been unimaginable to both the recording industry and to 
lawmakers just a decade prior. A commentator has noted, “The legal implication raised by the 
Internet's lack of centralized control is the resulting difficulty for copyright owners to… ‘track 
use of intellectual property.’”1 Copyright violations became “commonplace,” and “moreover, the 
anything goes attitude held by many Internet users, many of whom [consider themselves] ‘huge 
music enthusiasts,’ complicated the process of enforcing copyright protection.”2 At the turn of 
the millennium the focal point in the mainstream media that captured the attention of the general 
public was that of the litigation war that took place over peer to peer file sharing.3 The record 
                                                            
1
 Kenneth D. Suzan, Comment, Tapping to the Beat of a Digital Drummer: Fine Tuning US Copyright Law for 
Music Distribution on the Internet, 59 ALB. L. REV. 789, 794 (1995) (quoting Mike Godwin, The Law of the Net: 
Problems and Prospects, INTERNET WORLD, Sept.- Oct. 1993, at 52, 54, available at 
http://w2.eff.org/Misc/Publications/Mike_Godwin/law_of_the_net_godwin.article). 
2
 Id. 
3
 See Anita Hamilton, The Pirates of Prime Time, TIME, Feb. 25, 2002, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1001876,00.html. 
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industry relentlessly pursued Internet users who exchanged digital copies of entire songs through 
centralized mechanisms such as Napster and Aimster.4  
Beyond mere peer to peer file sharing, another concern that caught the attention of the 
record industry was that of “streaming audio,” or “webcasting.” Streaming allows an Internet 
user to listen to music via the web without having to download and permanently store audio files 
onto their computers, essentially giving the listener access to whatever is playing on that station 
at that moment.5 A basic summation of webcasting is that “audio is transmitted over the Internet 
bit by bit, but never as a complete file,” thus preventing a “listener from record[ing] or sav[ing] a 
copy of the audio file.”6 The recording industry became increasingly concerned that the 
traditional balance that had existed between radio broadcasters and themselves would be 
disturbed, and that consumers would find alternative avenues to purchase music or at least find 
ways to circumvent the entire process of purchasing that would extract the recording industry’s 
products and “thus erode sales of recorded music.”7 Webcast streaming has evolved in different 
stages, resulting in several attempts by Congress, through multiple amendments to the Copyright 
Act of 1976, to categorize and more narrowly define the limitations of web streaming and its 
applications to copyright law.8  
On one hand, the earliest inception of streaming was found in what is known as Internet 
Radio, “a medium that resembles the AM/FM industry in terms of the relationship between the 
                                                            
4
 See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, HN 8 (West 9th Cir. 2001) (finding that “[u]ploading 
and downloading of digital audio files containing copyrighted music, through Internet services that facilitated 
transmission and retention of such files by its users, was not fair use of copyrighted works, in that use was 
commercial and could save users the expense of purchasing authorized copies”); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 
F. Supp. 2d 634 (N.D. Ill. E. Div. 2002); BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005). 
5
 Samuel Fifer & Gregory R. Naron,, Changing Horse in Mid-Stream: The Copyright Office’s New Rule Makes 
Broadcasters Pay for “Streaming” Their Signals over the Internet, 3 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 182, 184 (2001). 
6
 Matthew J. Astle, Will Congress Kill the Podcasting Star?, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161, 170 (2005).  
7
 Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 488 (3rd Cir. 2003). 
8
 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) (codified as 
amended in sections throughout 17 U.S.C.); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998) (codified throughout sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
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recording industry and its abilit[ies] to generate record sales.”9 This particular medium directly 
resulted in litigation with implications that were felt in small market stations, massive 
conglomerates, and the independent webcasters streaming from their own homes.10 In many 
cases, these internet radio stations were owned by actual radio stations who simultaneously 
broadcasted their regularly scheduled programs.11 A major hurdle that faced webcast services 
broadcasting via the Internet resulted from the Librarian of Congress’ issuing of new royalty 
rates for Internet radio stations in June, 2002.12 These new rates placed simultaneous Internet 
retransmissions of over-the-air AM or FM radio broadcasts, as well as original transmissions 
through webcasters, at seven cents per musical performance.13 As a result of these rates, many 
Internet radio stations ceased to exist, citing operations costs that could not afford the payment of 
the rates per song.14 Essentially, what was left of webcasting services were those webcasters who 
provided users with individualized stations. These services allowed web users to affect the 
content of these individualized stations through means such as user ratings of songs, artists, and 
albums.15  
It is the latter type of internet radio station, not those simply broadcasting simultaneously 
traditional radio programs, but instead providing individualized stations, which this note focuses 
on.  As the Second Circuit’s recent opinion in Arista Records v. Launch Media, LLC 
demonstrates, the debate over royalties continues as the growth of the Internet and the services of 
                                                            
9
 Emily D. Harwood, Note, Staying Afloat in the Internet Stream: How to Keep Web Radio from Drowning in 
Digital Copyright Royalties, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 673, 675 (2004). 
10
 See, e.g., Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763, 766 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
11
 See generally Harwood, supra note 9. 
12
 Copyright Office, Library of Cong., Summary of the Determination of the Librarian of Congress on Rates and 
Terms for Webcasting and Ephemeral Recordings, http://www.copyright.gov/carp/webcasting_rates_fi 
-nal.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2009). 
13
 Allison Kidd, Recent Development, Mending the Tear in the Internet Radio Community: A Call for a Legislative 
Band-Aid, 4 N.C. J.L. &TECH. 339, 353-54 (2003). 
14
 Id. at 352. 
15
 Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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webcasting expand with it.16  The question facing the Arista court was whether the webcasting 
service, LAUNCHcast (“Launch”),17 was an “interactive service” as defined by the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).18 This critical distinction served to categorize webcasting 
services as either interactive services or non-interactive services for a multitude of purposes, one 
of which was the paying of royalty fees as determined by the Copyright Royalty Board.19  
This note will examine the Second Circuit’s analysis of Arista. As the first federal 
appellate court called upon to determine this question, the decision provides guidance to how 
future courts facing similar webcast service questions can follow the basic structure laid out by 
the analysis. By finding that Launch was “not an interactive service as a matter of law,”20 similar 
webcast services who have been engaged for years in a struggle to pay copyright fees and have 
been on the brink of collapse, potentially have been given a safe harbor within the DMCA. The 
court’s analysis sheds light upon certain elements that can distinguish what these webcast 
services must demonstrate in order to fall under the statutory language of non-interactive 
services.  Part II will consider the legislative history and its influences on webcasting services. 
Part III will analyze the Second Circuit’s holding in Arista, with a focus on how Launch, through 
its composition, distinguishes itself as a non interactive service. Finally, Part IV will look at the 
future of webcast services and how Arista will affect their ability to remain viable under current 
copyright law. 
 
 
                                                            
16
 Id. 
17
 Id. at 150 (noting that LAUNCHcast is a service owned by Launch Media, Inc. which is owned by Yahoo!, Inc.). 
18
 Id. 
19
 17 U.S.C.A. § 114(j)(7) (West 2009). 
20
 Arista, 578 F.3d at 150. 
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II. The Emergence and Evolution of Webcast Law 
A. Interactive Under § 114(j)(7) 
The implication of the Arista decision on webcast services that provide individualized 
stations is significant, as the potential to be categorized as a non-interactive service could affect 
the viability and survival of these services. The decade following the passage of the DMCA has 
burdened webcasters with enormous copyright fees that have left the majority of services on the 
brink of financial ruin, much akin to the fate of many simultaneous radio broadcasters who could 
not afford the copyright fees.21 Had Launch been adjudged to be interactive by the Second 
Circuit, “the service would have been required to pay individual licensing fees to those copyright 
holders of the sound recordings of songs the webcasting service play[ed] for its users.”22 If not, 
then the “service [would] only pay a statutory licensing fee set by the Copyright Royalty 
Board.”23 The crux of the analysis hinged on the definition of “interactive.”24 The court stated 
that, “The meaning of the phrase in question must significantly depend on the context in which 
Congress chose to employ it.”25 
B. Sound Recording Rights Under Copyright Law 
Article I of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”26 Congress adopted the first Copyright Act 
in 1790, which gave minimal protection to various works, such as books, and resulted in the 
majority of these works being copyrighted for only fourteen years before becoming a part of the 
                                                            
21
 See Kidd, supra note 13. 
22
 Arista, 578 F.3d at 150. 
23
 Id. 
2417 U.S.C.A. § 114(j)(7); Arista, 578 F. 3d at 152. 
25
 Arista, 578 F. 3d at 152. 
26
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
6 
 
public domain.27 The Copyright Act of 1909 was the first to recognize copyrights for music, and 
in doing so granted protection for the musical composition, essentially the right to the “original 
words and arrangements of the music.”28 This allowed copyrights to be granted to author of a 
work.29 Today, “virtually every creative work imaginable is automatically copyrighted,”30 
including musical recordings.31  
The content of the majority of webcasts, including webcast services such as Internet 
Radio, is music.32 There exist two privileges in each musical recording.33 In order for a 
webcaster to play a recorded piece of music, they are required to obtain licenses for both of these 
copyrights.34 The first, as was recognized in the Copyright Act of 1909, is the copyright in the 
“musical work.”35 This entails the lyrics and music as they were written by the composer and 
lyricist.36 When a song is broadcast over the airwaves by radio stations, every play of that song is 
worth money in the form of royalties to the songwriter and publisher.37 The composers of these 
songs tend to license their rights to associations such as the American Society of Composers, 
Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) or Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), who collect these licenses, 
giving them the ability to negotiate for copyright royalties.38 As a result, businesses such as 
                                                            
27
 Edward L. Carter, Promoting Progress or Rewarding Authors? Copyright Law and Free Speech in Bonneville 
International Corp. v. Peters, 2002 BYU L. REV. 1155, 1156-57 (citing Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First 
Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1062 (2001)). 
28
 Kidd, supra note 13, at 345; see Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 . 
29
 Jeffrey R. Houle, Note, Digital Audio Sampling, Copyright Law and the American Music Industry: Piracy or Just 
a Bad “Rap?,” 37 LOY. L. REV. 879, 887 (1992). 
30
 Harwood, supra note 9, at 676 (citing Carter, supra note 27, at 1157). 
31
 Id. at 676. 
32
 Astle, supra note 6, at 171. 
33
 Jay L. Bergman, Digital Technology Has the Music Industry Singing the Blues: Creating a Performance Right for 
the Digital Transmissions of Sound Recordings, 24 SW. U. L. REV. 351 (1995). 
34
 Astle, supra note 6, at 171.  
35
 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2006) (lists “musical works, including any accompanying words” as a category for which 
copyright protection exists). 
36
 Astle, supra note 6, at 171. 
37
 Kimberly F. Craft, The Webcasting Music Revolution Is Ready to Begin, As Soon as We Figure Out the Copyright 
Law: The Story of the Music Industry at War with Itself, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 1, 4 (2001). 
38
 Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 487 (3rd Cir. 2003). 
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restaurants, bars, hotels, and radio stations purchase licenses from these associations which 
authorize them to perform musical works that are found in the associations’ catalogues.39 The 
associations then collect fees from the users and distribute them in the form of royalties to the 
songwriters and publishers.40 
The second copyright privilege is the recorded performance of the song, called the 
“sound recording.”41 The Copyright Act states that while all other copyrighted works are fixed in 
“copies,” sound recordings are fixed in “phonorecords.”42 The Copyright Act defines 
phonorecords as “material objects in which sounds…are fixed by any method now known or 
later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”43 Congress granted the 
first copyright protection for sound recordings with the passage of the Sound Recordings Act of 
1971 (SRA) in an attempt to fight back against recording piracy.44 This copyright is applied to 
the physical recorded final product such as compact discs, cassettes or MP3s,45 and recognizes a 
right in the actual recorded version of the song.46 Within the music industry, the sound recording 
copyright is usually owned by record labels who are members of the trade association, the 
Record Industry Association of America (RIAA).47 
                                                            
39
 Craft, supra note 37, at 5. 
40
 Id. 
41
 Astle, supra note 6, at 171. 
42
 Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673, 686 (2003). 
43
 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). “Copies” under the statute are defined as material objects, other than phonorecords, in 
which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term “copies” includes 
the material object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed. Id. 
44
 Bonneville, 347 F.3d at 487. 
45
 Joshua D. Levine, Note, Dancing to a New Tune, a Digital One: The Digital Performance Right in Sound 
Recordings Act of 1995, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 624, 627-28 (1996).  
46
 Harwood, supra note 9, at 676. 
47
 Loren, supra note 42, at 686. The record labels identified as the “Big 5” include: Sony Music Entertainment, 
Warner Brothers Music, EMI Group, Universal Music Group, and BMG Entertainment. Loren quotes the RIAA 
mission statement, which now states that its “members create, manufacture and/or distribute approximately 85% of 
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Even though a copyright in the reproduction of sound recordings had been established by 
the SRA, a significant limitation that continued to exist was that the sound recording copyright 
owner was not granted a right to control the public performance of the work.48 Thus, while radio 
stations were able to pay copyright royalties to the composers of songs through the copyright of 
the “musical work” to have the right to broadcast the music, they did not have to pay the RIAA 
royalties for the same broadcast.49 Without copyright protection, owners of sound recordings 
were left with no legal recourse when they encountered a copyright infringement of their work,50 
nor did they have a right to receive any financial compensation.51  
In attempt to address this disparity, and influenced by heavy lobbying from the recording 
industry, the 1976 Copyright Act originally included a full public performance right for sound 
recording copyright owners with a compulsory licensing system.52 Outright opposition from 
broadcasters and music publishers played a significant role in defeating the provisions.53 As a 
result, “the recording industry and broadcasters existed in a sort of symbiotic relationship 
wherein the recording industry recognized that radio airplay was free advertising that lured 
consumers to retail stores where they would purchase recordings.”54 As part of this symbiotic 
relationship, broadcasters would be liberated from paying fees, licensing or otherwise, to the 
recording industry for the right to play the songs on the air.55 This tremulous position would 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
all legitimate recorded music produced and sold in the United States.” RIAA, Who We Are, 
http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php (last visited Apr. 20, 2010). 
48
 Bonneville, 347 F.3d at 487. 
49
 Id. 
50
 Stuart Talley, Performance Rights in Sound Recordings: Is There Justification in the Age of Digital 
Broadcasting?, 28 BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS’N J. 79, 84 (1994).  
51
 June Chung, The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act and Its Failure to Address the Issue of 
Digital Music’s New Form of Distribution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1361, 1363 (1997). 
52
 William H. O’Dowd, Note, The Need for a Public Performance Right in Sound Recording, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
249, 253-54 (1994). 
53
 Loren, supra note 42, at 687. 
54
 Bonneville, 347 F.3d at 487. 
55
 Id. at 488. 
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remain for nearly two decades, only to be disturbed by the technological advancements and 
emergence of the Internet in the 1990s.56  
During the interlude between the passing of the Copyright Act of 1976 and the Digital 
Performance Right in Sound Recording Act of 1995 (DPRA), Congress considered and 
ultimately rejected the issue of a performance right in sound recordings on three separate 
occasions.57 This repeated rejection, and the acceptance by all parties, can be attributed to the 
existence of that symbiotic relationship, as during this near two decade period the lack of 
performance right in sound recording did not generate economic loss for the industry as a 
whole.”58 
C. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 
 The introduction of digital technology into mainstream culture forced Congress to once 
again revisit the question of performance rights for sound recordings.59 In October of 1991, at the 
request of the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, the 
Copyright Office issued a report on the copyright implications of digital audio broadcasts and 
cable services.60 The report stated: “Technological changes have occurred that facilitate 
transmission of sound recordings to huge audiences. Satellite and digital technologies make 
possible the celestial jukebox, music on demand, and pay-per-listen services….Sound recording 
authors and proprietors are harmed by the lack of a performance right in their works.”61 
                                                            
56
 Harwood, supra note 9, at 679. 
57
 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 89-93 (1st ed. 1994) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 1805- 97 (1981); 
H.R. REP. NO. 997-96 (1979); H.R. NO. 6063-95 (1977)); see Chung, supra note 51, at 1363. 
58
 N. Jansen Calamita, Note, Coming to Terms with the Celestial Jukebox: Keeping the Sound Recording Copyright 
Viable in the Digital Age, 74 B.U. L. REV. 505, 513 (1994).  
59
 Rebecca F. Martin, Note, The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995: Can It Protect U.S. 
Sound Recording Copyright Owners in a Global Market?, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 733, 740 (1996). 
60
 Id.; S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 11 (1995). 
61
 S. REP. NO. 227-104 (1995) (submitted by Sen. Hatch, Committee on the Judiciary), available at 
http://www.ipmall.fplc.edu/hosted_resources/lipa/copyrights/The%20Senate%20Report%20on%20the%20Digital%
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This report laid the groundwork for Congress to embark on a path towards a resolution over 
adding protection to sound recordings in the new digital age.62 
 In 1993, the National Information Infrastructure Task Force was instructed by President 
Clinton to create a report that would incorporate a new strategy for technologies of interactive 
networks and future developments.63 The report recommended that Congress not exempt on-line 
service providers from strict liability, as this would prematurely deprive the system of an 
“incentive to get providers to reduce the damage to copyright holders by reducing the chances 
that users will infringe by educating them, requiring indemnification, purchasing insurance, and, 
where efficient, developing technological solutions to screening out infringement.”64 “Denying 
strict liability in many cases would leave copyright owners without an adequate remedy since 
direct violators could act anonymously,” and further, may not have the financial resources to pay 
a judgment.65 The findings of the report played a significant role in the consideration of Congress 
during the debate and passing of the DPRA.66 Furthering this was a push from the music industry 
which sought to subdue possible threats from interactive and subscription webcasts, “fearing that 
allowing listeners to hear the songs of their choice on demand would cut into record sales.”67 
 The House of Representatives Report for the DPRA declared that the concerns posed by 
the music industry were the catalyst for the decision of Congress to develop new legislation to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
20Performance%20Right%20in%20Sound.pdf (citing Register of Copyright, Report on Copyright Implications of 
Digital Audio Transmission Services 154-55 (Oct. 1991)). 
62
 Martin, supra note 59, at 740-41. 
63
 Douglas J. Mason, Fixation on Fixation: Why Imposing Old Copyright Law on New Technology Will Not Work, 
71 IND. L.J. 1049, 1055 (1996); see Chung, supra note 51, at 1364. 
64
 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373 n.19 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
65
 Id. 
66
 Chung, supra note 51, at 1365. 
67
 Astle, supra note 6, at 172. 
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amend the Copyright Act.68 This change came in large part from the recognition that the shifting 
landscape of music, in which the trend within the industry towards digital transmission of sound 
recordings, was likely to become an important outlet for the performance of recorded music, and 
needed to be addressed.69 The Report stated that while new digital transmission technologies 
could permit consumers to enjoy performances of a broader range of high quality recordings than 
ever possible, “in the absence of appropriate copyright protection in the digital environment, the 
creation of a new sound recordings and musical works could be discouraged, ultimately denying 
the public some of the potential benefits of the new digital transmission technologies.”70 An 
important rationale focused on by the House Report was the need to enact legislation addressing 
the potential impact on the prerecorded music industry of digital subscription an interactive 
services.71 The report noted: 
Copyright owners of sound recordings should enjoy protection with respect to interactive 
and certain digital subscription performances. By contrast, free over-the-air broadcasts 
are available without subscription, do not rely on interactive delivery, and provide a mix 
of entertainment and non-entertainment programming and other public interest activities 
to local communities to fulfill a condition of the broadcasters’ license.72 
 
Certain types of subscription and user controlled interactive audio services had the potential to 
adversely affect sales of recordings and erode copyright owners’ ability to control and be paid 
for use of their work.73 The House further stated that “interactive services are most likely to have 
a significant impact on traditional record sales, and therefore pose the greatest threat to the 
livelihoods of those whose income depends upon revenues derived from traditional record 
                                                            
68
 See H.R.REP. NO 104-274 (1995). 
69
 Id. at 15. 
70
 Id. 
71
 Id. 
72
 Id. at 16. 
73
 Id. at 13. 
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sales.”74 The language of the DPRA addressed a multitude of digital services, but focused 
specifically on the knowledge of the user prior to the playing of a song, concluding that “the 
more advance information the user has about the digital transmission, the more the transmission 
facilitates a user’s private copying…or, at least, enables the user to substitute listening to the 
targeted performance for purchasing a copy of it.”75  
 What the DPRA did do was extend a limited public performance right to sound 
recordings, “allowing the owner of a copyright in a sound recording to receive royalty payments 
for the first time.”76 One of the major criticisms of the DPRA, however, was that the new sound 
performance right created by the amendments was too narrowly drawn and included far too 
many exceptions.77 The DPRA created three categories of digital audio transmission. The first 
was that of interactive services, the category that had caused the greatest amount of concern to 
the industry in the buildup to the amendment’s passage.78 The DPRA defined an interactive 
service as: 
One that enables a member of the public to receive, on request, a transmission of a 
particular sound recording chosen by or on behalf of the recipient. The ability of 
individuals to request that particular sound recordings be performed for reception by the 
public at large does not make a service interactive. If an entity offers both interactive and 
non-interactive services (either concurrently or at different times), the non-interactive 
component shall not be treated as part of the interactive service.79 
 
                                                            
74
 Id. at 14; see Arista Records, LLC. v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting H.R. REP. 
NO. 104-274, at 13); S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 13-17 (1995)).  The Senate expressed similar concerns as the House on 
this issue. 
75
 Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the “Digital Millennium,” 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137, 167 
(1999).  
76
 Kidd, supra note 13, at 348. 
77
 Arista, 578 F.3d at 154-55. 
78
 Astle, supra note 6, at 172. 
79
 17 U.S.C.A. § 114(j)(7) (West 2009). 
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For this category there were no exceptions, requiring instead a webcaster to “negotiate a license 
with the holder of the copyright in the sound recording, who could legally withhold 
permission.”80  
The second category under the DPRA was that of non-interactive subscription services, 
in which a user would pay for access to a webcast service, but had little to no control over which 
music would be selected.81   The DPRA allowed webcasters and record companies in this 
category to come together and negotiate royalty rates.82 If those negotiations proved to be 
fruitless, then a federal Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) would be convened by the 
U.S. Copyright Office to decipher the proper rate.83 
The final category included services which were non-subscription, non-interactive digital 
transmissions that included radio broadcasts available free of charge.84 Services that fell under 
this categorization were completely exempt under the DPRA.85 
D. Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
What the DPRA did not include in the amendments to the Copyright Act was regulation 
of webcasting services, which “were exempted both from the sound recording copyright owner’s 
right of control, and from the obligation to secure a statutory or negotiated license.”86 By 
contrast, “webcasters remained liable to composers of the underlying music if the recordings 
were transmitted without a license from the music copyright holders.”87 Since webcasting 
services were non-subscription, in that they provided no particular sound recording at the user’s 
                                                            
80
 Astle, supra note 6, at 172. 
81
 Id. 
82
 Kidd, supra note 13, at 348.. 
83
 Id. 
84
 Harwood, supra note 9, at 680. 
85
 Id. 
86
 Ginsburg, supra note 75, at 167. 
87
 Id. at 168. 
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request, they did not fall under the purview of the DPRA’s definition of being interactive.88 This 
quickly became a cause for consternation amongst the recording industry in the wake of the 
DPRA’s passage, as the focus of these webcast services would either allow users to figure out a 
method to record or copy webcast music that was being transmitted via the free service,89 or they 
had the possibility of foregoing the purchase of music altogether and simply listen to the 
webcasts free of charge.90 This fear of lost profits for the music industry was reflected by the 
claim of the General Counsel of the RIAA when she stated that “the record industry was losing 
one $1 million a day due to music piracy.”91 
In response to these fears, Congress once again enacted legislation that amended the 
Copy Right Act. The DMCA extended the performance right under the DPRA to webcasters who 
do not charge their listeners subscription fees.92 A webcaster who provided a non-interactive 
service and followed the guidelines laid out by the amendments would be able to attain a 
compulsory license, allowing the webcaster to avoid having to pay each recording company that 
had the sound recording copyright for each song played.93 Those webcasters who allowed users 
to select, download, or have the ability to alter the programming list of music were not permitted 
to attain the compulsory license.94 Instead, these interactive services incurred full copyright 
liability under the performance right, and were “forced to conduct arm-length negotiations with 
the copyright owners of the sound recordings for a license before making a digital transmission 
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of a sound recording.”95 These outcomes came about because the definition of an interactive 
service was altered under the DMCA.96 It was expanded to include services which are specially 
created for an individual.97 The new definition of an “interactive service” under the amendment 
was:  “One that enables a member of the public to receive a transmission of a program specially 
created for the recipient, or on request, a transmission of a particular sound recording, whether or 
not as part of a program, which is selected by or on behalf of the recipient.”98 
The definition immediately became a point of contention between the RIAA and the 
Digital Media Association (DiMA).99 On April 17, 2000 DiMA filed a Petition for Rulemaking 
with the Copyright Office.100  The petition sought to have the Office amend the rule that defined 
the term “service” because copyright holders of sound recording had taken “the untenable 
position that consumer-influenced webcasting of any nature is not eligible for the DMCA 
statutory license.”101 DiMA’s proposed amended rule established guidelines that would 
essentially find that a service would not be interactive merely because it offered the consumer a 
degree of influence of a streamed programming.102 
Although it rejected the DiMA proposal, the Copyright Office noted that it agreed with 
DiMA that consumers could express preferences for certain musical genres, artists, or even songs 
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themselves without per se categorizing the service as being interactive.103 It further cited the 
DMCA Conference Report, which distinguished between certain activities that had the potential 
to make a service interactive, but provided no substantive answer.104 The question posed to the 
Copyright Office, the same that would be placed before the Arista court, was “how much 
influence can a consumer have on the programming offered by a transmitting entity before that 
activity must be characterized as interactive?”105 The answer given by the Copyright Office was 
that “[s]uch a determination must be made on a case-by-case basis after the development of a full 
evidentiary record in accordance with the standards and precepts already set forth in the 
statute.”106 
Thus, as the Arista court stated, the legislative history beginning with the passing of the 
SRA and extending through the DMCA clearly showed that, “Congress enacted copyright 
legislation directed at preventing the diminution in record sales through outright piracy of music 
or new digital media that offered listeners the ability to select music in such a way that they 
would forego purchasing records.”107 The only possible way to decipher whether a service was 
“interactive” within the meaning of § 114(j)(7) would have to be to conduct a full analysis of the 
actual service itself, and in doing so distinguish the level of influence that the consumer had on 
the programming. 
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III. Arista Records, LLC. v. Launch Media, Inc. 
The Arista court endeavored to answer the question of whether Launch could be 
categorized as an interactive service within the meaning of U.S.C. § 114(j)(7). After examining 
and interpreting the legislative history of the amendment, the court turned to an in-depth analysis 
of the Launch service.108  
The court noted that a webcasting service like Launch “would be interactive if a user 
could either (1) request-and have played-a particular sound recording, or (2) receive a 
transmission of a program ‘specially created’ for the user.”109 The primary problem facing the 
court in its interpretation of the definition was how to construe the meaning of the operative term 
“specially created.”110 As the Copyright Office stated in its own analysis of the statute, “No rule 
can accurately draw the line demarcating the limits between an interactive service and non-
interactive service. Nor can one readily classify an entity which makes transmissions as 
exclusively interactive or non-interactive.”111 The Second Circuit would have to do a detailed 
examination of the service itself. The analysis of the setup and function of Launch laid out 
certain factors and distinguishing features that could be beneficial to courts in other Circuits in 
their own interpretation of “interactive services” under § 114(j)(7). 
A. LAUNCHcast 
 The courts analysis was predicated on the overlying theme of the legislative history and 
construction of the DMCA, that Congress was “clear that the statute sought to prevent further 
decreases in revenues for sound recording copyright holders.”112 The rationale for that focus in 
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analyzing services such as Launch indicates that if a user has enough control over an interactive 
service that they would be able to substantially predict the songs that will be heard, and such 
activity would cause the user to continue to use that service in lieu of purchasing the actual 
record.113 Therefore, the court created a definitive link between the congressional intent of the 
legislation and the “concern that an interactive service provides a degree of predictability based 
on choices made by the user-that approximates the predictability the music listener seeks when 
purchasing music.”114 It is that degree of predictability that the Arista court sought to distinguish 
in its analysis. 
A brief overview of how Launch operates must be outlined in order to fully appreciate 
the court’s findings.115 When a user initially logs on, they are prompted to select artists and 
genres of music that they prefer, rating each of these in the process.116 The user is asked what 
percentage of new music the user would like to incorporate into their station, a percentage called 
the “unrated quota.”117 Each time a user logs into the service and selects a station, a playlist of 
fifty songs is compiled (the “final playlist”).118 At no time does the user get to see what songs are 
in the initial pool (the “hashtable”), nor does the user get to see what songs are in the final 
playlist while it is being played.119 Thus, the user is never cognizant of what songs are on that 
particular station that has been generated until after the song has been played.120  
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 The process of choosing the songs that will eventually make the final playlist is taken 
almost completely out of the control of the user.121 The hashtable is composed of approximately 
10,000 songs.122 These songs are factored in for various reasons, the first 1000 added because 
they are the most popular songs as rated by all Launch users in the bandwidth that the user 
initially selected.123 All of the songs that the user has rated (“explicitly”), or has had subscribers 
of his individual station have rated, and songs that appear on any of the albums containing songs 
rated by the user (“implicitly”) are added to the hashtable, usually amounting to around 4000 
songs.124 Then the service adds another 5000 songs by counting up all of the total number of 
songs in all of the genres the user specified, and dividing them by the total number of songs in 
the entire Launch database.125 This ensures that “of the 5,000 random songs added to the 
hashtable, a sufficiently large number are for genres eligible to be selected for inclusion on the 
final playlist.”126 However, if the total percentage of songs in the user’s selected genres is more 
than 5%, then a large number of the 5000 songs picked for the initial hashtable will be chosen 
randomly from the entire database, and not just from the user’s selected genres.127  
 With 10,000 songs in the hashtable, Launch then sorts the songs based on three categories 
of ratings: (1) explicit; (2) implicit; and (3) unrated.128 The service takes several steps through 
this ratings process to whittle down the amount of songs that can be played on the final playlist. 
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For example, no more than 20% of all explicitly rated songs can be selected for the final 
playlist.129 
 Having selected which songs from the hashtable are candidates to make the final playlist, 
Launch begins creating that list by picking songs at random from each of the three categories, 
with five restrictions.130 First, any song whose inclusion would violate the initial mathematical 
calculation would be excluded.131 Second, no song can be played twice in a playlist.132 Third, a 
song is excluded if three other songs by that same artist have already been selected for the 
playlist.133 Fourth, songs are excluded from the playlist if two other songs from that same album 
have been chosen already.134 Finally, a song that might make the list is by an artist or from an 
album already chosen, it will be excluded unless at the end of the selection the user has fewer 
than fifty songs on the final playlist.135 After the fifty songs have been set, Launch orders the 
final playlist, randomizes the songs, and allows the user to begin listening.136 
B. The Second Circuit’s Analysis of LAUNCHcast 
 The court’s examination of Launch revealed several factors that, under the statutes 
relevant language, helped it to arrive at the conclusion that the service was not interactive. First, 
the rules of the service that decides which songs would be gathered in the hashtable ensures that 
the user has virtually no opportunity to choose, let alone predict, which particular songs will be 
                                                            
129
 Id. (stating that another step is that LAUNCHcast selects “no more than three times the quotient of the total 
number of explicitly rated songs divided by the sum of implicitly and explicitly rated songs”). 
130
 Id. at 160. 
131
 Id. at 159. 
132
 Id. 
133
 Id. (giving an example that if three Beatles songs have already been selected, there is no possibility for a fourth 
Beatles song to make the final playlist). 
134
 Id. 
135
 Id. 
136
 Id. at 160. 
21 
 
pooled together before the final playlist is rendered.137 The court noted that at a minimum, 60% 
of the songs that go into the initial hashtable were generated by factors that the user had almost 
no control over.138 The fact that of the 10,000 songs that go into the hashtable, 6000 of them are 
selected with absolutely no consideration of the user’s song, artist, or album preference suggests 
that user control from the initial steps has already begun to be stripped before the final playlist is 
even confirmed.139 In addition, no more than 20% of the explicitly rated songs can even be 
selected for the hashtable, which ensures that only a limited amount of these songs will make the 
final playlist.140 The court notes that this safeguard “effectively means that the more songs the 
user explicitly rates, the less the user can predict which explicitly rated songs will be pooled in 
the hashtable and played on the playlist.”141 Therefore, if a user attempts to influence which 
songs will make the final playlist and thus create predictability by explicitly rating a high volume 
of songs that she wants to hear again, or even choosing a minimal amounts of genres at the 
outset, Launch operates in a way to nullify this attempt at predictability by building in levels of 
safeguards of limitation and exclusion in the formulaic selection of the songs for the hashtable. 
 Secondly, the rating of each song entails variables that restrict user control.142 
Restrictions exist on the number of times a songs by “particular artists or from particular albums 
can be played, along with restrictions on consecutive play of the same artist or album.”143 In 
addition, each time a user logs on to Launch a unique playlist is created for them. If a user wants 
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to hear a song from that playlist again and attempts to log off and come back on in an attempt 
reset the playlist, the service will simply load the same playlist and play out its remainder from 
the point that the user had logged off.144 Launch does not allow a user to view the unplayed 
songs in the playlist, nor restart a song that is playing or repeat any of the previously played 
songs.145 In fact, the only user controlled certainty that lends itself to predictability is the user’s 
ability to rate a song with a score of zero, thus ensuring that the song will not be heard by that 
user again.146 Dismissing this notion of user control, the court stated, “the ability not to listen to a 
particular song is certainly not a violation of a copyright holder’s right to be compensated when 
the sound recording is played.”147 
 The court therefore concluded that although the fact that Launch’s playlists are uniquely 
created for each user, that factor alone does not ensure predictability. In fact, “ the unique nature 
of the playlist helps Launch ensures that it does not provide a service so specially created for the 
user that the ceases to purchase music.”148 The critical factors then in examining a webcast 
service such as Launch is the degree of user control and predictability of the music being played. 
While Launch certainly grants the user the opportunity to provide input for the overall direction 
that the playlist will take in order to at least give the user an enjoyable experience that is to a 
degree catered to their preferences, it never allows the user to predict nor anticipate what 
particular song, artist, or even album will be played, nor the position within the final playlist that 
a potential song could even be located. Therefore, by following this analysis, the Second Circuit 
properly found that within the meaning of the definition of “interactive service” under the 
DMCA, Launch does not fall into the categorization because it does not give the user enough 
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control to substantively influence the service, and thus would not be a viable alternative in lieu of 
purchasing music that would in the aggregate diminish record sales. 
IV. The Future of Webcasting and the Implications of Arista 
The holding of Arista has the potential to profoundly affect the future of webcasters and 
their sustainability. While some commentators signaled that the determinations of higher royalty 
rates by CARP starting in 2002 would have such an incredibly debilitating effect on many 
American webcasters that it could possibly equate to the overall demise of webcasting,149 the 
survival of webcasting services has been bolstered by recent events. The Arista decision allows a 
plethora of webcasting services, including large commodities such as Pandora and 
TheRadio.com, to continue to classify their services as interactive and thus not subject to the 
hardships that would entail negotiating separate copyright clearance deals with each copyright 
holder. The court outlined significant elements that must be taken into consideration in order to 
be classified as such, and thus future and current services have a roadmap that they can utilize to 
ensure they fall into the category of interactive as defined by the DMCA.  
The major hurdle for non-interactive services since the passing of the DMCA, has been 
the negotiation of royalty fees under the statutory licensing fee set by the Copyright Royalty 
Board.150 Such fee increases have brought  services to the brink of financial ruin.151 For example, 
in 2007 the Copyright Royalty Board increased the fee to play music on webcasts from eight 
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cents per song to nineteen cents per song.152 The increase left non-interactive services paying 
fees that in certain cases amounted to massive percentages of their projected annual revenue.153 
 However, in 2009 an agreement was brokered between webcasters and 
SoundExchange.154 The agreement offered an alternative set of comparatively high rates and 
terms to those issued by the Copyright Royalty Board in 2007. According to the agreement, the 
new formula is “good through 2014 and 2015 for different sized players, includes revenue 
sharing for most services − up to 25 percent of U.S. revenues in some cases − and more reporting 
requirements in exchange for a discount on per stream rates.”155 These increased rates have 
caused webcast services to restructure and limit user availability to free listening.156  
V. Conclusion 
At the present time, the survival of non-interactive webcasting services remains a 
possibility. However, the rising cost of licensing fees remains a lingering problem that will 
continue to plague webcasters in future negotiations. The recent experimental formula brokered 
between SoundExchange and Pandora represent only a possible, albeit temporary, solution for 
future royalty crisis’s, yet does little to quail the rising costs associated with operating a non-
interactive webcasting service. Yet what the holding in Arista has done is to ensure that the 
statutory language of the DMCA has been properly applied to webcasting services. By putting 
forth an analysis that focused on user control and predictability, the court was able to establish 
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guidelines for interpretation of the definition of an “interactive service” under the DMCA. In 
doing so, the court opened the door to providing a safe harbor for all services in compliance to be 
categorized within the statutory exemptions, and thus have a fighting chance for survival. 
